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State Primacy, Federal Consistency or Collaborative Management: 
Can Cooperative Federalism Models From Other Laws
Save Our Public Lands?
By Hope BabcockI. Summary
Few would assert that the historical institutional 
paradigm for managing the nation's public lands has protected 
the natural resource values of those lands or provided an 
harmonious framework for resolving conflicts over their use. 
Recurrent proposals to privatize public lands or to devolve 
their ownership to the states compete with plans to enhance 
the federal presence or expand federal jurisdiction. The 
emergence of the wise use and county primacy ("empowerment") 
movements directly challenge the authorityy of the federal 
government to manage its land. While this new local and state 
assertiveness is not without historical basis nor completely 
without merit, Fairfax, Andrews & Buchsbaum, "Federalism and 
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Now You See It, Now You
Don't" 59 Wash. L. Rev. 417 (1984), its proponents have yet to 
offer a workable solution other than complete ouster of the 
federal sovereign. Shanks, This Land is Your Land (Sierra 
Club Books, 1984).
Some worry that an enhanced state role on public lands is 
inconsistent with environmental protection. The courts 
disagree, supporting a "rejuvenated federalism," in the 
administration of environmental programs, in general, and on 
public lands, in particular. Leshy, Granite Rock and the 
States' Influence Over Federal Land Use, 18 Envtl. L. 99
(1987); New York v. United States. ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct.
2408 (1992); California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock 
Company. 480 U.S. 572 (1987). The era of federal dominance on 
public lands is over, and whatever tradition of "cooperative 
federalism" on these lands there has been, is unraveling.
Emerging theorems in conservation biology and ecology, 
which are changing our view of the natural landscape and how 
it should be managed, are placing additional strains on the 
federal-state relationship on public lands. Chaos and 
biological diversity have replaced equilibrium and single 
specie restoration as biological goals; resource management 
has become a grand and "risky" experiment, in which human 
change is viewed as just one more "flux." Bosselman & 
Tarlock, "The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: 
An Introduction," 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 847 (1994). The nature 
of ecosystems, which transcend political boundaries, Meyer, 
"The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology," 69 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 875 (1994), require transboundary consultation, 
coordination and even consistency in defining and managing 
shared resources. Keiter, "NEPA and the Emerging Concept of 
Ecosystem Management on the Public Lands," 25 Land & Water L. 
Rev. 43 (1990).
Our present "enclave strategy" for managing public lands, 
found in single-use designations and politically drawn 
boundary lines, creates barriers to ecosystem management. 
Sax, "Nature and Habitat Conservation and Protection in the
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United States," 20 Ecology L.Q. 47 (1993). Increasing demands 
for recreational and residential opportunities in the once 
pristine buffer zones surrounding public lands is rapidly 
eroding the federal land manager's ability to protect the 
federal portion of these systems, and eliminating any 
protective hedge those lands once offered. Keiter, "Taking 
Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and 
Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region," 60 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 923 (1989). Institutional and process harmony among the 
various levels of government must be achieved not only on 
public domain lands, but also on adjacent and intermingled 
private and state lands, if the goals of conservation biology 
and ecosystem management are to be realized.
The era of single use dominance on public lands may be 
over as well. Wilkinson's "Lords Of Yesterday," Crossing the 
Next Meridian (Island Press 1992), have been replaced by many 
different public lands "communities," defined by geographic 
boundaries, interest and occupation. Bates, "Public Lands 
Communities: In Search of a Community of Values," 14 Pub. L. 
Law Rev. 81 (1993). Conservation biology's "adaptive 
management" is necessary to preserve social, not just 
biological diversity and to respond to flux in these 
communities. Institutions and procedures designed to 
accommodate bipolar conflicts need to be readjusted to work in 
a polycentric, changing world.
The working premise of this paper is unless a dramatic
change in the federalism structure for the management of 
public lands is made, the conflict over their use and 
management will continue to blight the future of these lands, 
just as it has marred their past. Nowhere is this conflict 
more intense than on "public domain" lands; those lands 
managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) principally 
under the direction of the Federal Land Policy & Management 
Act (FLPMA). 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
This paper looks at models of "cooperative federalism" 
found in non-public lands laws to see whether they reduce the 
federalism tensions inherent in the management of public 
domain lands, create an ecologically rational system of 
natural resource management and/or facilitate the development 
of diversified, integrated, inclusive communities. While any 
acceptable substitute paradigm would also have to avoid 
unsettling long-held expectations, creating unnecessary costs, 
or fostering distributional inequity, such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper contains several working assumptions. First, 
that the present federal-state balance on public domain lands 
is too broken to be fixed with minor changes to existing 
public lands laws and institutions. The current paradigm 
cannot be saved. Radical change is required.
Second, the debate should move forward from the question 
"who should own the public lands" to what process or 
institutions should be in place for their management. Issues
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of state or county devolution and privatization, therefore, 
are not discussed in this paper. (On the issue of maintaining 
public ownership over public domain lands compare Sax, "The 
Legitimacy of Collective Values: The Case of the Public
Lands," 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 537 (1985) with Huffman, "Public 
Lands Management in an Age of Deregulation and Privatization," 
10 Pub. Lands Rev. 29 (1989)). Further, since none of the 
models requires a change in the normative goals set out in the 
public lands laws, the validity of those goals is not 
questioned in this paper.
A third working assumption is that the Western states are 
more sympathetic today to national norms calling for 
protection of the natural resource values of public domain 
lands than in days past; an attitudinal shift due in part to 
regional demographic changes. Bates, Getches, MacDonnell,
Wilkinson, Searching Out the Headwaters:____ Change and
Rediscovery in Western Water Policy (Island Press, 1993); 
Cowart & Fairfax, "Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory
and Administrative Reality," 15 Ecology L. Q. 375 (1988).
Some will find this to be a dubious assumption. Slightly more 
problematic is whether the Western states can undertake 
additional responsibilities for management of these lands 
without an infusion of new funds. The unfunded mandates 
problem could doom any solution which has this result.
Although each of the models would change the current 
balance of power among the three levels of governments on
public domain lands by increasing the state and/or local role, 
none proposes complete recision of federal authority over 
these lands. The paper's final assumption is that a 
continuing federal presence is necessary to assure consistency 
among states and fulfillment of national norms, and to 
implement multi-jurisdictional management decisions.
After examining the state primacy, federal-state 
consensus and federal consistency models found in the federal 
pollution control laws, National Estuary Program and Coastal 
Zone Management Act, respectively, the paper concludes that 
the "consistency" or "layered federalism" model comes closest 
to a positive "coupling" of state actions and national norms. 
Stewart, "Madison's Nightmare," 57 U. Chi. 335, 352 (1990). 
The state primacy (dual regulation) model continues existing 
federalism tensions, while the federal-state consensus model 
introduces new, potentially debilitating problems for land 
managers. Only the consensus model, however, offers a 
mechanism to achieve rational ecosystem management, because, 
unlike the other two, it can transcend state boundaries. The 
consensus model also provides the only mechanism for public 
lands communities to participate on an equal basis with 
governments in resource management decisions.
II. Failure of Existing Federalism Model
A. federal legal primacy/supremacy on public domain lands 
historical experience. Coggins, "The Law of Public 
Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple
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Use Mandates," 14 Envtl. L. 1 (1983).
1. FLPMA fails to adjust this balance and provide for 
meaningful state role in management of public 
lands. Beyle, "A Comparison of the Federal 
Consistency Doctrine Under FLPMA and the CZMA," 9 
Va. Envtl. L.J. 307 (1989). FLPMA's "consistency" 
provisions stop short of giving states and local 
communities a land use planning based veto over 
activities on public domain lands. Leshy, "Granite 
Rock and the States' Influence Over Federal land 
Use," 18 Envtl. L. 99 (1987).
B. severely degraded public resources, tragedy of the 
commons. Huffman, "Public Lands Management In An Age of 
Deregulation and Privatization," 10 Pub. Lands L. Rev. 9, 
49 (1980).
C. capture of federal land management agencies by "Lords of
Yesterday." Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian 
(Island Press, 1992); Coggins, "The Law of Public 
Rangeland Management IV: FLMPA, PRIA, and the Multiple
Use Mandate," 14 Envtl. L. I (1983).
D. state environmental management capabilities (political 
and legal authority, institutional capacity and 
information-base) have improved as a result of experience 
administering pollution control laws and interacting with 
federal government under multiple-use statutes. Fairfax, 
Andrews & Buchsbaum, "Federalism and the Wild and Scenic
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Rivers Act: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 59 Wash. L.
Rev. 417 (1984).
E. federalism tension, friction, frustration fuel country
supremacy/wise use movements. Miller, "All Is Not Quiet 
on the Western Front: The Battle for Public Lands," 7
Inst, on Plan., Zoning & Eminent Domain 7-1 (1994);
Miller, "The Western Front Revisited," 26 Urb. Law. 845 
(Fall, 1994).
F. scientific developments and demographic changes make 
prevailing model anachronistic and counter-productive, 
create opportunities (and challenges) for federalism 
experiments.
1. conservation biology, ecosystem management and 
notions of "sustainability" defy utility of 
political boundaries. Keiter, "Beyond the Boundary 
Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management,"
65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293 (1994); Keiter, "Taking
Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law
and Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region," 60 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 923 (1989); Ruhl, "Biodiversity
Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal 
Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for
Something Completely Difference, 66 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 555 (1995); GAO, "Ecosystem Management:
Additional Actions Needed to Adeguately Test a 
Promising Approach," GAO/RCED-94-111 (August 1994).
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a. biodiversity protection requires site-
specific, decentralized decisionmaking.
However, this can create problems because 
localized jurisdictional boundaries do not 
conform to scientific imperatives of habitat 
protection, controversies at local level
intense and less subject to countervailing 
forces, less revenue support and regulatory 
power at local level, and greater potential to 
interfere with local property use. Tarlock, 
"Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: 
What Is Its Niche?" 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555
(1993) .
b. conservation biology's adaptive management 
practices at odds with law's need for legal 
boundary certainty. Noss, "Some Principles of 
Conservation Biology As They Apply to 
Environmental Law," 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 893
(1994) .
regional demographic changes (urbanization, 
increasing power of recreationists and 
preservationists, and fragmentation into many 
public lands communities) threaten continuing 
dominance of single-interest public lands users. 
Also providing impetus for states to affect greater 
interest in increasing state fiscal and
environmental controls over public lands resources. 
Cowart & Fairfax, "Public Lands Federalism: 
Judicial Theory and Administrative Reality," 15 
Ecology L. Q. 375 (1988).
II. State Primacy (dual regulation) - pollution control model
A. states promulgate/enforce own regulatory programs in 
compliance with strict federal guidelines. On-going 
federal programmatic oversight of state performance. 
Federal government retains authority to reassert federal 
jurisdiction, restrict/condition state funding, 
independently enforce law, if state performance 
unsatisfactory, and to respond to interstate problems.
1. model's predicates (poor state historical record,
need for national uniformity to avoid industry 
forum shopping, nation's size and geographical 
diversity, nexus between land use and pollution, 
federal government's limited resources) inapposite 
to public lands experience. Stewart, " Pyramids of 
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental 
Policy," 86 Yale L.J. 1196 (1977).
B. model offers no reduction of federalism tensions because 
of conflict inherent in federal oversight role.
1. although offers substantial enhancement of state 
role (replaces federal agency/laws/courts with 
federally-approved state equivalents), friction and
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potential for conflict inherent in system in which 
one jurisdiction takes lead in developing policies 
another has the responsibility to implement/fund. 
Elliott, "Federal Versus State Environmental 
Protection Standards: Can a National Policy Be
Implemented Locally, Keystone Presentation: Making 
the Partnership Work," 22 ELR 10,010 (Jan. 1992); 
Melnick & Willes, "Watching the Candy Store: EPA
Overfiling of Local Air Pollution Variances," 20 
Ecology L.Q 207 (1993); GAO, "EPA and the States: 
Environmental Challenges Require a Better Working 
Relationship," GAO/RCED-95-64 (April 1995):
a. states excluded from policy development, state 
comments/concerns not given priority
b. inconsistent federal oversight, micro- 
management of state programs, duplication, 
delay, conflicting decisions, lack of 
finality/sensitivity to state concerns
c. states too responsive to local political 
pressure, too eager to accommodate local 
economic interests, national goals lost in 
balancing equities in individual cases
2. although national uniform standards and federal 
oversight increase parity among states while 
allowing for some site-specific adjustments 
(SIPS/SWQS) and local experimentation (variances),
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political severity of oversight tools (recision of 
state primacy, reduction/conditioning of federal 
grants, cross-compliance penalties) and limited 
federal resources undermine effectiveness of 
federal oversight and willingness to allow local 
experimentation.
3. federal funds/technical assistance insufficient to 
offset burden of being primary regulatory authority
C. although model does not eliminate barriers to rational 
ecosystem management to extent preserves political 
boundaries, some features could be helpful:
1. invites regional planning and standard setting, 
federal agency facilitates disputes between states
D. although public participation central feature of model, 
participation essentially bipolar and adversarial.
1. administrative process formalism creates barriers 
to participation by inchoate communities; bipolar 
exchange between regulated industry and government
III. Federal-State Consensus - National Estuary Program Model
A. institutional framework/process for preparation of plan 
by multi-jurisdictional conference (states, federal 
agencies, regional and international authorities, 
educational institutions, public) to restore/maintain 
designated estuaries (tragedy of commons). Federal 
government approves plan upon state concurrence; federal 
actions must be consistent with plan. 33 U.S.C. § 1330.
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B. although model provides for significant reduction in 
federalism tensions, offers no mechanism for 
implementation of plan, high transaction costs.
1. achieves federal-state parity (state concurrence); 
flexible partnership, in which partners invited to 
work cooperatively and federal government's role 
essentially that of a facilitator. State/local 
acceptance of final product enhanced because 
participated in design. However, consensus process 
also creates substantial transaction costs, 
compromised final product. New bureaucratic 
structure, administration costs only partially 
offset by federal funds/technical assistance.
2. implementation/enforcement awaits conformance of 
state laws to new standards/requirements; ultra- 
jurisdictional solution dependent upon existing 
enforcement authority.
C. model's ecosystem basis for governance/jurisdictional 
boundaries allows for rational ecosystem management.
1. planning approach (foresight) allows for adaptive 
management; normative guidance reduces conflicts
D. model's consensus approach allows for examination of 
assumptions, invites inclusive thinking and provides 
means for finding common ground among various interests. 
Bates, "Public Lands Communities; In Search of a 
Community of Values," 14 Pub. L. L. Rev. 81 (1993).
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Coastal ZoneIV. Federal Consistency (layered federalism) - 
Management Model
A. states develop/administer federally funded/approved 
coastal resource management programs that meet uniform 
federal standards. Federal activities (within/outside 
plan area) affecting the coastal zone must be consistent 
with state programs to "maximum extent practicable" 
unless contrary to national interest. Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq; Secretary of the 
Interior v. California. 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
Coordination between various levels of government and 
agencies within each level key to controlling coastal 
development and limiting environmental damage. Rychlak, 
"Coastal Zone Management and the Search for Integration," 
40 Depaul L. Rev. 981 (1991).
1. federal funds and power shift to states perceived 
as correcting past distributional inequity (nation 
received benefits of coastal development and states 
bore costs). LaLonde, "Allocating Burden of Proof 
to Effectuate the Preservation and Federalism Goals 
of the Coastal Zone Management Act," Note, 92 Mich. 
L. Rev. 438 (Nov. 1993). (Distributional inequities 
on public lands offset just by federal funds).
2. states' ability to manage coastal areas seen as 
superior to federal government, because states had 
resources, administrative machinery, enforcement
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powers, constitutional authority, and experience. 
Beyle, "A Comparison of the Federal Consistency 
Doctrine Under FLPMA and the CZMA," 9 Va. Envtl. 
L.J. 207 (1989). (Contrasts with states' public
lands experience.)
3. traditional federal "sticks" (threatened cutoff of 
needed funds, new/expanded causes of action in 
federal court and detailed statutory/regulatory 
directives) replaced by direct financial assistance 
and consistency provision. Wolf, "Accommodating 
Tensions in the Coastal Zone: An Introduction and
Overview," 25 Nat. Resources L.J. 7 (Jan. 1985).
B. substantial reduction in federalism tensions, but state 
lead without clear national standards and effective 
federal oversight can create differences between states, 
inequity. Federal-state tensions replaced by state-local 
tensions.
1. although states' powers enhanced and state/local 
concerns elevated above federal, states' ability to 
impose more stringent requirements can cause non- 
uniform changes in regulatory burdens imposed on 
applicants by federal laws, regulatory differences 
between coastal and non-coastal states, transaction 
costs. Whitney, Johnson & Perles, "State
Implementation of the Coastal Zone Management 
Consistency Provisions - Ultra Vires or
15
c
Unconstitutional?" 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 67 
(1988).
2. primarily state-enforced, although federal
government can restrict/condition funding and 
withdraw plan approval. Program's broad scope and 
federal resource limitations threaten to enervate 
program or turn it into one-issue program. 
Hildreth and Johnson, "CZM in California, Oregon, 
and Washington," 25 Nat. Res. J. ___ (Jan. 1985).
3. elevates local concerns by encouraging states to 
tailor plans to meet local needs; allows for state 
experimentation/innovation. Although states must 
consider federal interests in draft plans and 
conform to national criteria, state plans can 
differ significantly, inviting forum shopping and 
jurisdictional inequities.
4. federal consistency requirement can function as 
conflict avoidance mechanism (triggers multi- 
jurisdictional negotiation), avoid duplication by 
eliminating inconsistent regulatory requirements.
But consistency can also cause conflict. Various 
levels of government operate with "tunnel vision," 
independent of each other. Conflicting/redundant 
requirements create disharmony between governmental 
units, resulting in less uniformity/integration, 
turf wars, less environmental protection. Program
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battleground for conflicting philosophies over 
power distribution between state/local governments. 
Rychlak, "Coastal Zone Management and the Search 
for Integration," 40 De Paul L. Rev. 981 (1991).
C. ecological focus of model offers some capacity for 
rational ecosystem management, but still limited by 
political boundaries.
1. planning approach allows for adaptive management, 
although can be source of conflict, because no 
clear guidance as to how balance should be set
D. although model's planning element invites participation 
by divers community interests, once plan approved process 
becomes less inclusive and more formal.
V. Conclusion
No single model offers a panacea to the federalism tensions, 
ecosystem management irrationality and lack of community 
inclusivity that afflict public domain lands today. The least 
helpful of the models reviewed in this paper is that presented 
by the pollution control laws. Both the Coastal Zone 
Management Act and the National Estuary Program models offer 
features that might improve the situation on public domain 
lands, but each of these would require adjustment to fit the 
political and geographic terrain to which it would be applied.
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